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COMMENTS
Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co.: Rejection




In 1988, the United States Department of Health and Human
Services issued a report documenting the pervasive problem of
lead poisoning among the nation's children.' Although lead in
adults is of concern, and has been associated with increases in
blood pressure and other abnormalities, infants and young children
are more at risk from exposure to lead than adults. In fact, severe
childhood lead poisoning has been known to cause kidney failure,
t J.D., 1995, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. The author would
like to thank Professor David M. Engel for his helpful comments and encouragement in the
writing of this comment.
1. AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCE AND DISEASE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN
THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1988)[hereinafter HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES REPORT]. Lead poisoning disproportionately affects young children and infants be-
cause of the differences between their metabolic rates and excretory capability as compared
to adults. Id. at I-5. Pregnant women also expose their unborn children to lead poisoning
because the lead they absorb can cross the placenta and impair brain development in the
fetus. Id. at 8-9.
2. Infants and young children are more at risk from exposure to lead than adults be-
cause of the following factors:
(1) their neurological systems are developing and are more vulnerable to damage;
(2) their frequent hand-to-mouth activity brings them into greater contact with
lead in the environment, especially in dust and soil; (3) their bodies absorb and
retain a larger percentage of ingested lead per unit of body weight than adults,
and more of the lead in the body is available in the blood and soft tissues to exert
toxic effects; and (4) children often experience nutritional deficiencies (especially
of iron, calcium, and other metals) that enhance uptake, absorption, and retention
of lead in the body.
U.S DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, COMPREHENSIVE AND WORKABLE
PLAN FOR THE ABATEMENT OF LEAD-BASED PAINT IN PRIVATELY OWNED HOUSING, 2-1 to 2-2,
1990 [hereinafter HUD PLAN].
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gastrointestinal problems, seizures, coma, and pronounced mental
retardation. Additionally, the report estimated that twelve million
children under the age of seven reside in housing with dangerously
toxic levels of lead.$
Not surprisingly, injuries involving lead exposure have given
rise to a number of lawsuits brought against the lead industry in
the 1980s. Initially, the victims of lead-based paint poisoning fo-
cused their efforts primarily on landlords as their defendants.
Landlords, however, often lacked sufficient assets or insurance to
pay damage awards to plaintiffs.4 More recently, lead pigment
manufacturers and the lead industry have been the focus of nu-
merous cases alleging that their products have caused a variety of
injuries to young children. Plaintiffs have brought suit against
these manufacturers on various products liability theories such as
negligent product design, negligent failure to warn, and breach of
warranty.'
In Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,7 a victim of lead-based
paint poisoning brought a claim against the manufacturers of white
lead used in lead-based paints." In a matter of first impression, the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dis-
missed the plaintiff's claims, holding that the theory of market
share liability would not be extended to cases of lead-based paint
poisoning. The court stated that its interest in separating "wrong-
doers from innocent actors" necessitated the rejection of market
share liability in the context of lead-based paint.9 On appeal, the
First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
3. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. The Report to Congress
also estimated that the number of children (under age seven) who were exposed to lead from
dust and soil ranged from 5.9 to 11.7 million. The number of children exposed to lead from
leaded gasoline was.5.6 million. Another 3.8 million children were exposed to lead from
drinking water. Id. at 7-8. See generally Martha Mahoney, Four Million Children at Risk:
Lead Paint Poisoning Victims and the Law, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 46, 46 (1990).
4. Originally, paint poisoning victims brought suit against their landlords, seeking mon-
etary compensation for their children's injuries and removal of the hazard from their homes.
In turn, landlords would implead manufacturers as third parties if they were not already
joined. See generally Hurt v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 806 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
5. See Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. CIV.A.90-7064, 1992 WL 23450 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 3, 1992); LeBlanc v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 551 N.E.2d 30 (Mass. 1990); Christopher v.
Duffy, 556 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
6. See, e.g., Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Mass. 1992),
aff'd, 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993).
7. 782 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Mass. 1992), afl'd, 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993).
8. Although most of the defendants in Santiago are paint manufacturers, "the grava-
men of Santiago's complaint against them relates to their role as manufacturer of lead pig-
ment and bulk supplier to other paint producers." 782 F. Supp. at 188.
9. Id. at 191 (quoting Payton v. Abbott Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188 (Mass. 1982)).
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MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
ment to the defendants, reasoning that to hold otherwise would
"create a substantial possibility that tortfeasors and innocent ac-
tors would be impermissibly intermingled.'
10
This Article contends that the Santiago decision is significant
in two respects: (1) Santiago represents one of the most recent
cases limiting market share liability to diethylstilbestrol (DES)
cases; and (2) Santiago is a serious setback for plaintiffs seeking to
recover for lead-based paint poisoning. Essentially, this article ex-
plores the implications of Santiago for other lead-based paint law-
suits and discusses the future of market share liability in this area
of products liability law.
The first part of this Article discusses the DES litigation and
the inception of the market share theory of liability in the
landmark decision of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories." Next, this
Article reviews the treatment of market share liability by courts
both within and outside the DES context. The next part focuses on
the problem of product identification and the future of market
share liability in lead-based paint litigation in light of the recent
Santiago decision. Finally, this Article concludes that the Santiago
court's reasoning is fundamentally flawed because the court failed
to appreciate the flexibility of market share liability, particularly
the version of the doctrine that was adopted by the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts.' 2 Consequently,
this Article concludes that despite the rationale articulated by
Santiago, it is clear that the First Circuit, like most courts, is re-
luctant to apply market share liability simply because the doctrine
represents too radical of a departure from the fundamentals of
traditional tort law. This Article takes the position that although
market share liability arose solely within the context of DES, the
social and economic ramifications behind lead poisoning demand
courts to apply this theory to more than a single product.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
Traditional tort theory requires a plaintiff to establish a spe-
cific link between the causal agent and the injury before a plaintiff
may recover damages.' In some products liability cases, however, a
plaintiff may not be able to identify the specific agent that caused
10. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 551 (1st Cir. 1993).
11. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
12. See McCormack v. Abbott Lab., 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding that a
plaintiff injured by DES who cannot meet the traditional identification requirement is enti-
tled to recovery based on a market share theory of liability).




the injury because of the long latency period between the incident
that gave rise to the injury or disease and the manifestation of the
injury. In response to this identification problem, the California
Supreme Court created the market share theory of liability.14
A. DES Litigation
From the 1940s to the 1970s, the drug DES was prescribed for
pregnant women to prevent miscarriages." In 1971, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) banned the marketing of DES to preg-
nant women after medical studies suggested "a statistically signifi-
cant association between the outbreak in young women of clear cell
adenocarcinoma 6 with the maternal ingestion of DES during preg-
nancy.' 7 These DES injuries have generally been limited to
women whose mothers used DES during their pregnancies. By the
time the FDA prohibited the use of DES for pregnancy-related
complications, about three million pregnant women had already in-
gested the drug."' After the FDA ban, a large number of lawsuits
were filed against DES manufacturers by the daughters of women
who took the drug during their pregnancies.
Under traditional products liability doctrine, three essential
requirements must be satisfied before an injured plaintiff may re-
cover against the manufacturer of an injurious product. First, the
14. See generally Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal.) (holding that a
plaintiff's inability to identify a specific manufacturer of an allegedly defective product did
not require dismissal of the action against the defendant drug companies), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980).
15. DES is a synthetic substance that duplicates the activity of estrogen, a female hor-
mone crucial to sexual development and fertility. See Patricia A. Meagher, Note, Market
Share Liability: A New Method of Recovery for DES Litigants, 30 OATH. U. L. REv. 551
(1981) (chronicling the history of DES from 1947 to the discovery, in 1971, that it might
cause cancer in women). DES was developed in England by Dr. E.C. Dobbs in 1937. See
Barry S. Roberts & Charles F. Royster, DES and the Identification Problem, 16 AKRON L.
REv. 447 (1983) (providing a comprehensive background on the history of the drug DES and
the subsequent legal problems that developed).
16. Adenocarcinoma is a cancer which can occur in the vagina, cervix, or uterus. See
generally Mark V. Connolly, Note, Market Share Liability and DES - Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories: Square Pegs in Round Holes, 13 CONN. L. REv. 777 (1981).
17. David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability in DES Cases: The Unwarranted Ero-
sion of Causation in Fact, 40 DEPAuL L. REV. 771, 775 (1991). Although DES is no longer
used as a miscarriage preventative, it is still prescribed as an estrogen replacement for
women. Id.
18. See Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liabil-
ity, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963, 964-66 n.6 (1978) (discussing the historical development of
DES and advocating the use of market share theory of liability); see also Victor E. Schwartz
& Liberty Mahshigian, Failure to Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a Legitla-
tive Solution, 73 CAL. L. Rv. 941, 943-45 (1985).
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plaintiff must show that the product is defective. Second, the
plaintiff must show that the defective product is attributable to
the party to be held responsible. Finally, the plaintiff must show
that the defect in the product caused the plaintiff's injury.19 It is
the second requirement, the identification requirement, that has
proven to be most problematic to DES plaintiffs. Plaintiffs encoun-
tered significant difficulties when trying to prove which manufac-
turer supplied the particular DES used by their, mothers when
they were in utero because the latency period of adenocarcinoma is
about ten to twenty years.20 By the time the plaintiffs discovered
their injuries and brought lawsuits against DES manufacturers,
many physicians, pharmacies, and manufacturers had discarded
most of their records.2 1 As a result of the lack of records, the large
number of DES manufacturers, the generic appearance of the drug,
and the latency period between exposure and injury, the plaintiff's
burden of identifying the culpable manufacturer was extremely
difficult to satisfy.
2
B. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,"3 plaintiff Judith Sindell
brought a class action24 suit against Abbott Laboratories and ten
other drug companies, alleging that she had suffered personal inju-
ries as a result of her mother's ingestion of the prescription drug
DES, a miscarriage preventative. Since she was unable to identify
19. Dale A. Coggins, Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 980, 997
(1979).
20. In addition to the identification requirement plaintiffs in DES lawsuits face a num-
ber of other legal problems: (1) class action certification; (2) possible running of the statute
of limitations; and (3) denial of a cause of action because the injury was prenatal or before
viability. Roberts, supra note 15, at 450-51. The most significant obstacle, however, is
clearly the problem of identifying the culpable defendant. The failure of the plaintiff to
establish a link between the causal agent and the alleged injury usually results in a grant of
summary judgment for the defendant. See also Payton v. Abbott Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171
(Mass. 1982) (holding that a threshold requirement in any products liability action is the
identification of the injury-causing product and its manufacturer); Garside v. Osco Drug,
Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1990) (supporting the general rule that if a plaintiff cannot
establish who or what caused her injury, summary judgment for the defendant is
appropriate).
21. See also Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333, 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), rev'd, 560
N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990).
22. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
23. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
24. Judith Sindell brought a class action suit seeking to represent "'girls and women
who are residents of California and who have been exposed to DES before birth and who
may not know that fact or the dangers' to which they were exposed." Id. at 925 n.1.
1995]
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the manufacturer of the pills that her mother ingested, she ad-
vanced theories of alternative liability,25 concert of action,2  and
enterprise liability.
2 7
25. The theory of alternative liability was developed to address problems confronted by
a plaintiff injured by only one of two or more independent tortfeasors and where plaintiff is
unable to identify which defendant caused her injury. Alternative liability shifts the burden
of proof onto each defendant to show that it did not cause the plaintiff's injury. Failure to
do so results in joint and several liability for all defendants brought before the court. W.
PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KE TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 270-71 (5th ed.
1984). This doctrine has also been adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 433:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm
has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to
which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has
not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965). See also Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1948) (holding that where there is uncertainty as to which defendant actually injured
the plaintiff, and relative certainty that one of the defendants did injure the plaintiff, it is
inequitable to require the plaintiff to prove causation because defendants have greater ac-
cess to such evidence).
In Sindell, the California Supreme Court stated that liability in the DES context could
not be based on Summers for two reasons: (1) DES defendants faced problems of tracing
fungible products after a substantial period of time; and (2) where both parties who could
have caused the plaintiff's injuries were before the court in Summers, only five of the ap-
proximately two hundred manufacturers of DES were joined as defendants in Sindell. 607
P.2d at 924, 929-31.
26. A cause of action for concert of action exists when one defendant either acts with
others pursuant to a common plan to commit a tort or otherwise assists or encourages an-
other to carry out tortious activity. Under these circumstances, each defendant will be held
jointly and severally liable with those whom he has encouraged or with whom he has acted,
regardless of whether his own acts actually contributed to plaintiff's injury. See KEETON ET
AL., supra note 25, § 46, at 322-24. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS sets forth the
following elements for an action to be based upon concert of action:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he: (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursu-
ant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct consti-
tutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other so [as] to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in
accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, consti-
tutes a breach of duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
The Sindell court rejected the concert of action theory because reliance upon competi-
tors' marketing and testing methods was a prevalent and acceptable business practice, not a
tortious group conduct. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 932-33.
27. Id. at 927-28. The theory of enterprise liability was developed especially for the
DES problem in a 1978 student comment published in the Fordham Law Review. See Com-
ment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978).
In general, the term enterprise liability is used broadly to refer to the theory that losses
caused by an enterprise should be borne by that enterprise. Howard C. Klemme, The Enter-
prise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 158 (1976). The Sindell court,
however, rejected enterprise liability for three reasons: (1) the court found that the applica-
tion of the doctrine to an industry composed of at least two hundred producers is "mani-
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The trial court dismissed Sindell's action because she could
not identify the manufacturer of the DES in question.28 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, finding that
Sindell's complaint stated a cause of action under the alternative
liability and concert of action theories.2 9 The California Supreme
Court, however, expressly rejected all the proposed theories for
manufacturer identification advanced by Sindell. The court va-
cated the holding of the court of appeals and found for the plain-
tiff on its own theory of recovery based on market shares.30
Although the California Supreme Court stated that they were
merely modifying the alternative liability theory of Summers v.
Tice,31 the court clearly created a new theory of "market share lia-
bility." Under the market share theory of liability, the plaintiff is
required to join a "substantial share '3 2 of DES manufacturers and
prove that each was negligent.33 Once the plaintiff established in-
dustry-wide negligence and joined as defendants the manufactur-
ers of a substantial share of the market, each defendant must
prove that it did not manufacture the DES that the plaintiff al-
leged caused the injury. 4 If the defendants are unable to rebut this
presumption of causation, each defendant will be held liable "by
the percentage which the DES sold by each of them for the pur-
pose of preventing miscarriage bears to the entire production of
the drug by all for that purpose."3 "
A plaintiff may successfully avail herself of the theory of mar-
ket share liability if the following four requirements are satisfied:
(1) injury or illness occasioned by a fungible product
(identical-type product) made by all of the defendants joined in the lawsuit;
(2) injury or illness due to a design hazard, with each defendant having sold
festly unreasonable"; (2) DES manufacturers did not relate safety standards to their trade
association whereas in cases where defendants had been held liable under this theory the
defendants had; and (3) the court reviewed the role of the Food and Drug Association and
noted that it would be unfair to impose liability on a manufacturer "for injuries resulting
from the use of a drug which [manufacturer] did not supply simply because it followed the
standards of the industry." Sindell, 607 P.2d at 934, 935.
28. Id. at 926.
29. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 143-50 (Ct. App. 1978), vacated, 607
P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
30. Sindel, 607 P.2d at 936-38.
31. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936. The first modern theory of alterna-
tive liability was judicially created in Summers. See supra note 25.
32. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937. The decision in Sindell did not state what would consti-







the same type of product in a manner that made it unreasonably dangerous;
(3) inability to identify the specific manufacturer of the product that
brought about the plaintiff's injury or illness; and (4) joinder of enough of
the manufacturers of the fungible or identical product to represent a sub-
stantial share of the market.3 8
If these four requirements are satisfied, each defendant will be lia-
ble for the plaintiff's damages in an amount determined by its
share of the relevant market, unless a defendant can prove that it
could not have manufactured the product that caused the plain-
tiff's injury.
The Sindell court premised its support of market share liabil-
ity on three fundamental principles of tort law. First, the manufac-
turer of a defective product, not the plaintiff, should bear the cost
of injury.3 7 Second, the defendant manufacturer is better able than
the injured plaintiff to bear the cost of injury resulting from the
manufacturing of a defective product. 8 Finally, because the manu-
facturer is in the best position to discover and guard against de-
fects in its products and to warn of harmful effects, holding the
manufacturer liable for defects and failure to warn will provide an
incentive to ensure product safety.39 In essence, the California Su-
preme Court created market share liability because the available
tort remedies were simply inadequate. The court attempted to link
liability with culpability while dispensing with the identification
requirement.
C. Limitations of the Sindell Approach
Although theoretically innovative, the Sindell approach con-
tains several practical shortcomings. First, the court failed to de-
fine "substantial share"40 or "appropriate market.' ' 41 Second, the
Sindell approach assumes that if there is a substantial share of the
market represented in the case, there is a substantial likelihood
that the culpable defendant is actually before the court. The fact
remains that the defendants that happen to be before the court
may be no more responsible for the plaintiff's injury than manu-
facturers not joined as defendants. Third, although a particular de-
fendant may be negligent, he may not have acted in a negligent
manner toward this particular plaintiff. Finally, the Sindell deci-
36. KFEroN ET AL., supra note 25, § 103, at 714.
37. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
38. Id.
39. Id.




sion did not address the question of whether the defendants would
be held jointly and severally liable. This issue remained unan-
swered until Brown v. Superior Court,42 where the California Su-
preme Court held that DES manufacturers would be held severally
but not jointly liable.4 s
D. Variations On Market Share Liability
The landmark Sindell decision has been widely criticized,"
and most jurisdictions have rejected market share liability in the
form as it was first adopted in California. Consequently, Washing-
ton, New York, and Wisconsin have developed their own form of
market share liability to address the DES problem. These versions
of market share liability demonstrate the flexibility of the doctrine
and the willingness of some courts to reevaluate traditional tort
law in order to hold defendants liable for the injuries caused by
their products.
1. Washington: Market Share Alternate Liability. In Martin
v. Abbott Laboratories,5 the Washington Supreme Court was
called upon to address the DES dilemma. In Martin, Washington's
highest court created its own "market share alternate liability. ' 46
Although the court found the Sindell market-share theory to be
"conceptually attractive," the court rejected the Sindell approach
because it interpreted Sindell as requiring joint and several liabil-
42. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
43. Id. at 484-87. Brown was an action involving approximately 70 plaintiffs who had
been exposed to DES while in utero. The plaintiffs brought the action under the theories of
strict liability, breach of express and implied warranty, fraud, and negligence. Id. at 472.
For a more extensive discussion of joint and several liability, see KEETON E r AL., supra
note 25, § 47, at 327-28 ("When joinder is permitted, it is not compelled, and each tortfeasor
may be sued severally, and held responsible for the damage caused, although other wrongdo-
ers have contributed to it. .... ").
44. The Sindell decision has been criticized as adversely affecting consumers. Although
the theory encourages industries to devote more time to testing and guaranteeing the safety
of their products, consumers will be hurt in the short-term because they will be denied the
availability of potentially life-saving products. Richard P. Murray, Note, Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories: A Market Share Approach To DES Causation, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1179, 1201
(1981). Moreover, it has been argued that market share liablity will have the effect of reduc-
ing or delaying efforts to develop new drugs. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 941
(Cal.) (Richardson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The most pervasive
criticism of the theory, however, concerns the practical applicability of the theory. It has
been argued that the theory cannot practically be applied because the Sindell decision fails
to define the relevant market and what constitutes a substantial share of that market. Id. at
939.
45. 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984).
46. Id. at 381.
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ity.47 The Martin court stated that "[n]ot only does the Sindell
court fail to define 'substantial' share of the relevant market, the
theory distorts market liability by providing that the 'substantial'
market share bears joint responsibility for 100 percent of plaintiff's
injuries. 48
After the Martin court rejected the Sindell approach, the
court proceeded to fashion a theory of recovery which combined
elements of both the Sindell market share approach and alternate
liability.49 For instance, under Sindell, a plaintiff is required to
"join a 'substantial share' of the market."50 Under market share
alternative liability, a plaintiff needs only commence a suit against
one defendant. 1 Furthermore, under the Martin approach, a
plaintiff does not need to "prove that a defendant produced or
marketed the precise DES taken by the plaintiff's mother."52 In-
stead, the plaintiff needs only to establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, the following four elements:
[1] that the plaintiff's mother took DES; [2] that DES caused the plaintiff's
subsequent injuries; [3] that the defendant produced or marketed the type
of DES taken by the plaintiff's mother; and [4] that the defendant's con-
duct in producing or marketing the DES constituted a breach of a legally
recognized duty to the plaintiff.53
Moreover, the Martin approach provides defendants with an
opportunity to exculpate themselves from liability.4 A defendant
may avoid liability by proving one of the following circumstances:
[1] that [the defendant] did not produce or market the particular type [of]
DES taken by plaintiff's mother; [2] that [the defendant] did not market
the DES in the geographic market area of plaintiff mother's obtaining the
drug; or [3] that [the defendant] did not distribute DES in the time period
of plaintiff's mother's ingestion of the drug.5
Additionally, if the plaintiff is unable to produce sufficient evi-
dence to determine accurate market share figures in the plaintiff's
particular geographic market, the plaintiff may rely on countywide,
47. Id. at 379-80; see Brown, 751 P.2d at 484-87 (holding that Sindell calls for several,
not joint liability).
48. Martin, 689 P.2d at 381.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 379.
51. Id. at 381.






statewide, or nationwide figures.5 6 According to the Martin court,
however, the relevant market for determining liability should be as
narrowly defined as the evidence in a given case allows.57
Finally, the Martin court stated that the joined defendants are
all initially presumed to have equal market shares and so they are
equally liable for plaintiff's injuries.58 They can, however, reduce
potential liability by rebutting this presumption through the estab-
lishment of their true market share of the relevant geographic mar-
ket.59 If, however, a joined defendant is unable to demonstrate that
its market share is less than its presumptive share, that defend-
ant's percentage of liability will be increased to fully account for
100% of plaintiff's judgment.6 0
In turn, if a defendant demonstrates that its share of the mar-
ket is less than its presumptive share, that defendant's percentage
of liability will be reduced accordingly.6 In the event that all the
joined defendants are able to carry the burden of proving that
their share of the market was less than their presumptive share,
the plaintiff will be unable to recover 100% of her damages.62 The
court reasoned that by allowing each defendant to reduce its liabil-
ity, "the dilution of causal blame that is attributable to a given
defendant may be counterbalanced by the corresponding dilution
of liability."6
2. Wisconsin: Risk Contribution Theory. In Collins v. Eli
Lilly & Co.,6 4 the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the Sindell
approach to market share liability because of "the practical diffi-
culty of defining and proving market share." 6 The Collins court
noted that drug manufacturers may not have access to the records
that would allow a jury to reconstruct the relevant market of a
given defendant.6 Even assuming that such records are available,
56. George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507, 512 (Wash. 1987) ("This determination of
whether the evidence is relevant will be left to the trial court's discretion as it is in the best
position to decide in each case whether the national or regional figures are a good approxi-
mation for the relevant geographic market." (citation omitted)).
57. Martin, 689 P.2d at 382.





63. Id. In Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990), the Florida Supreme
Court adopted Martin's market share alternate liability theory.
64. 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
65. Id. at 48 (noting the difficulties of defining and proving market share where the




the court reasoned that the nature of the DES market also pre-
vents jurors from fairly and accurately defining the relevant mar-
ket. For instance, the court noted factors such as the fluidity of the
DES market, the fact that many DES companies are no longer in
existence, and the lack of nationwide records concerning the over-
all marketing and production of DES. 7
Notwithstanding the practical difficulties of defining and prov-
ing the market share of the DES defendants, the Collins court con-
cluded that it would not completely reject the market share theory
of liability. Instead, the court based its version of market share
liability on the risk of injury each manufacturer contributed to
each individual plaintiff."8 Under this "risk contribution" theory,
"the critical point is the creation of a risk that society deems to be
unreasonable, not whether anyone was injured by it.""s Therefore,
since all DES manufacturers produced or marketed a defective
product, they may all be held liable because "they all contributed
to the risk of injury, even though they may not have contributed to
the actual injury of a given plaintiff.
'70
A plaintiff bringing an action under the risk contribution the-
ory is not required to join a substantial share of the producers and
manufacturers of DES.7 Under the risk contribution theory, a
plaintiff may sue only one defendant. In order to establish a prima
facie case, the injured plaintiff does not need to
prove that a defendant produced or marketed the precise DES taken by the
plaintiff's mother. Rather, the plaintiff need only establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that a defendant produced or marketed the type (e.g.,
color, shape, markings, size, or other identifiable characteristics) of DES
taken by the plaintiff's mother; the plaintiff need not allege or prove any
facts related to the time or geographic distribution of the subject DES.
72
Moreover, a plaintiff may recover all damages from just one
defendant.7 3 If more than one defendant is joined, damages are ap-
portioned among the defendants under Wisconsin's comparative
negligence laws.74 Once a plaintiff has successfully proven its prima
facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. The defend-
ant is provided with an opportunity to prove that "it did not pro-
67. Id.
68. Id. at 49.
69. Id. at 50 n.10 (quoting Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflec-
tions on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713, 739 (1982)).
70. Id. (quoting Robinson, supra note 69, at 739-40).
71. Id. at 50.





duce or market the subject DES either during the time period the
plaintiff was exposed to DES or in the relevant geographical mar-
ket area in which the plaintiff's mother acquired the DES.
75
In determining each defendant's percentage of liability, the
court enumerated a number of factors the trier of fact may con-
sider when apportioning damages. For instance, the jury may con-
sider whether the market share of the defendant is large or small;
whether the defendant conducted safety tests on DES; whether the
defendant issued warnings; and the role the defendant played in
seeking FDA approval of the drug.76 Wisconsin's approach has
been criticized as expanding liability beyond Sindell because a de-
fendant can be held liable for merely creating a risk of harm, as
opposed to a probability of harm.77
3. New York: The Hymowitz Approach. In 1986, the New
York State legislature revived many DES claims by enacting a law
that "provided a one year window for the filing of previously
barred DES claims. '7 8 Although this New York statute opened the
New York courts to many DES lawsuits that were previously
barred by the statute of limitations, DES plaintiffs were stil' con-
fronted with the problem of the unidentifiable manufacturer. 79
In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,80 the New York Court of Ap-
peals chose not to adopt any one of the existing forms of market
share liability. Instead, the court decided to fashion its own version
of the doctrine based upon a national market."1 The court ex-
plained: "[W]e choose to apportion liability so as to correspond to
the over-all culpability of each defendant, measured by the amount
of risk of injury each defendant created to the public-at-large." 82
In New York, a manufacturer of DES can exculpate itself from lia-
bility only by proving that it did not market DES for pregnancy
use during the relevant period. 3 Furthermore, since liability is sev-
eral and not joint, the liability of a particular manufacturer will
not be inflated if all manufacturers are not before the court."
The distinctive features of the New York approach are as fol-
75. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 53.
77. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 334 (IlM. 1990).
78. Symposium, The Problem of the Indeterminate Defendant: Market Share Liability
Theory, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 863, 865 (1989).
79. Id.
80. 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
81. 539 N.E.2d at 1072.





lows: (1) a national DES market shall be used for determining the
proportional market share of each manufacturer of DES; (2) the
liability of each manufacturer of DES shall be several and not
joint; and (3) a manufacturer of DES cannot exculpate itself from
liability in a particular case by proving that its product did not
cause injury to the plaintiff. With respect to the final element, the
court reasoned that since a defendant's liability is "based on the
over-all risk produced, and not causation in a single case, there
should be no exculpation of a defendant who, although a member
of the market producing DES for pregnancy use, appears not to
have caused a particular plaintiff's injury."8 5
In contrast to the Washington and Wisconsin approaches, the
New York version of market share liability differs in several re-
spects. First, whereas Washington courts will attempt to define a
market as narrowly as possible, New York courts employ a national
market. Unlike Wisconsin's risk contribution approach, the New
York approach does not measure the risk of injury to a particular
plaintiff. Instead, New York measures the risk of injury to the
public at large.
In Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.,86 the Illinois court criticized the
New York approach for failing to equate liability to the actual
harm caused. 7 More specifically, the court rejected New York's
use of a national market because a particular defendant cannot es-
cape liability even if it produces evidence showing that it did not
market the drug in the geographical market where the plaintiff's
mother bought the drug.88
II. MARKET SHARE LIABILITY OUTSIDE THE DES CONTEXT
After Sindell, there have been numerous attempts by injured
plaintiffs to apply market share liability to products other than
DES. However, courts across the nation have generally refused to
extend market share liability to products other than DES. Inter-
estingly, instead of explicitly declaring that the doctrine is only
suited for the product DES, courts have decided to the limit the
scope of the doctrine on a product-by-product basis. Therefore, in
litigation involving products such as vaccines, pharmaceuticals,
breast implants, blood products,89 and asbestos, courts have ad-
85. Id.
86. 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ml1. 1990).
87. Id. at 334.
88. Id.
89. See Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting the Application of Market Share
Liability in Blood Products Litigation, 68 TuL. L. R~v. 883, 888 (1994) (asserting that the
theory of market share liability should not be extended to blood products because the the-
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hered to traditional legal principles, declining to recognize any
market share theory. Recently, in Florida and Hawaii, however,
market share liability has been extended to cases involving
hemophiliacs allegedly infected with AIDS from Factor VIII blood
products.9 But as this discussion will reveal, courts have already
begun to retreat from this recent trend.
A. Rejection in Asbestos Cases
Overall, the application of market share liability beyond DES
cases has been quite limited. For instance, although asbestos expo-
sure litigation parallels some of the characteristics in the DES
cases that gave rise to the development of market share liability,
most courts have refused to extend market share theories to asbes-
tos victims. 1
DES and asbestos litigation share a great number of similari-
ties. First, like clear cell-adenocarcinoma, asbestos-related dis-
eases 2 have a latency period of about twenty years.93 Additionally,
like DES defendants, a large number of companies manufactured
asbestos at one time or another. In fact, there are more than 165
companies that have produced or supplied asbestos products."4 Fi-
nally, asbestos plaintiffs have also had difficulty identifying the
particular manufacturer responsible for their injuries. Despite
these similarities, courts have not allowed asbestos victims to use
the market share approach.
9 5
In rejecting market share liability in the asbestos context,
courts have reasoned that asbestos does not satisfy the "fungibil-
ity" requirement. Unlike DES, which was produced pursuant to a
single formula, "asbestos fibers are of several varieties, each used
ory is fundamentally incompatible with the nature of blood products).
90. Ray v. Cutter Lab., 754 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Smith v. Cutter Biological,
Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw.), appeal denied, 827 P.2d 1148 (Haw. 1991).
91. See Leng v. Celotex Corp., 554 N.E.2d 468 (Il1.), cert. denied, 555 N.E.2d 337 (IMI.
1990) and cases cited therein. See generally John P. Burns et al., Special Project, An Analy-
sis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by the Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 573, 579 (1983)[hereinafter Special Project].
92. The diseases linked to asbestos exposure are lung cancer, asbestosis, and mesothe-
lioma. Gideon Mark, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 872-73 (1983).
93. John B. Milano, Jr., Texas Asbestos Claims and Market Share Liability: New
Remedy for an Old Tort, 13 ST. MARY's L.J. 957, 968 (1982).
94. Special Project, supra note 91, at 581 n.22.
95. See Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Ct. App. 1988);
White v. Celotex Corp., 907 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1990); University of New Hampshire v.
United States Gypsum Co., 756 F. Supp. 640 (D.N.H. 1991); Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743




in varying quantities by defendants in their products, and each dif-
fering in its harmful effects."9 6 Additionally, courts have also re-
fused to extend the theory because plaintiffs have failed to define
the asbestos market adequately." In attempting to define the as-
bestos market, plaintiffs enountered two major obstacles: (1) the
large variety of uses of asbestos; and (2) the fact that some plain-
tiffs were exposed to asbestos over many years during which time
some defendants began or discontinued making asbestos
products. 8
Hence, despite the obvious parallels in both DES and asbestos
litigation, courts have declined to recognize the applicability of
market share liability to asbestos injury litigation, concluding that
[s]uch an application would impose on the individual members of the asbes-
tos industry a program of compensation for injuries potentially caused by
any member of the industry devoid of considerations of actual causation by
the individual named defendant. The creation of a program of compensa-
tion for victims of asbestos related injuries as a matter of policy is a matter
for the legislative body and not for the courts.99
B. Rejection in Blood Product Cases
Courts have generally denied attempts to apply market share
liability to cases involving blood products. For instance, in Poole v.
Alpha Therapeutic Corp.,00 an Illinois federal district court re-
fused to extend market share in an action where a hemophiliac al-
legedly contracted Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
from an injection of a blood product.101 Although the plaintiff in
Poole identified and joined all the manufacturers that supplied the
blood product, she was unable to prove that any of the specific
defendants were liable.10 2 The court refused to follow Smith v. Eli
Lilly & Co.,103 another Illinois decision which allowed market share
liability for a DES case. The Poole court noted that Smith ex-
pressly limited its holding to DES cases. 04 The court held that it
would not expand tort law unjustifiably beyond precedent'05 and
96. In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
97. Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691, 700 (Ohio 1987).
98. Id. at 700-01.
99. Case, 743 P.2d at 1067.
100. 696 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. IMI. 1988).
101. Id. at 354.
102. Id.
103. 527 N.E.2d 333 (IlM. App. Ct. 1988), rev'd, 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990).
104. Poole, 696 F. Supp. at 353-54.
105. Id. at 354.
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that market share liability is inappropriate when the plaintiff has
identified all potentially negligent defendants." 6 The court stated
that a plaintiff's inability to identify the wrongdoer was one of the
principal rationales for the use of market share liability in
Sindell,07 and the absence of such a rationale precludes a plaintiff
from proceeding on a market share cause of action.
Furthermore, in the recent decision in Doe v. Cutter Biologi-
cal, Inc.,08 the Federal District Court for the District of Idaho also
determined that market share liability should not be applied to
anti-hemophilic blood products. 0 9 The district court found that
unlike DES, Factor VIII, a blood protein used by hemophiliacs for
proper blood coagulation, was not a fungible product.110 Addition-
ally, the court reasoned that unlike DES, Factor VIII could be
traced to the specific producer had the plaintiff kept such
records."' The court concluded that "even if the Idaho Supreme
Court had ever sanctioned the use of such a theory - and it has
not - it is not clear that the market share theory should be ap-
plied in the context of Factor VIII litigation."
1 2
C. Rejection in Breast Implant Cases
From 1962 to 1991, approximately two million women received
breast implants. 1 3 In 1991, the FDA reported the following risks
associated with breast implants: fibrous capsular contracture, sili-
cone gel leakage and migration, infection, early tumor detection
difficulties, degradation of polyurethane foam-covered breast pros-
thesis, cancer, birth defects, autoimmune disease, and calcifica-
tion." 4 As a result, breast implant victims have brought suit
against doctors and manufacturers for personal injuries sustained.
In Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,"' a breast implant victim
brought a products liability action against the manfacturer of med-
ical supplies for the injuries she sustained as a result of a ruptured
breast prosthesis."l 6 Confronted with the difficulty of identifying
106. Id.
107. Id. at 353.
108. 852 F. Supp. 909 (D. Idaho 1994).
109. Id. at 913-14.
110. Id. at 913.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Zoe Panarites, Breast Implants: Choices Women Thought They Made, 11 N.Y.L.
Scn. J. Hum. RTS. 163, 163 (1993).
114. Id. at 166.
115. 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989), aff'd per curiam, 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990).
116. 721 F. Supp. at 90.
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the specific manufacturer of the prosethesis, the plaintiff in Lee
employed a theory of market share liability in an attempt to hold
the defendant liable. In her complaint, the plaintiff stated: " 'de-
fendants do not attach any identifying marks to their breast im-
plant prosthetic devices and it is, therefore, impossible for the pa-
tient to identify which defendant is the manufacturer and/or
distributor of the product in question.' "117
The district court, however, granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. The court held that the plaintiff failed to
establish that the "defendant Baxter manufactured the prosthesis
which allegedly caused her injury."'"" In light of the fact that Ma-
ryland courts apply traditional products liability law, the court de-
termined that it was "axiomatic that the plaintiff prove by a pre-
ponderance of evidence at trial that the product which allegedly
caused" the plaintiff's injury could be traced to the named defend-
ant.": 9 Furthermore, the court stated that even if Maryland did
recognize the market share approach, it would not apply the theory
to breast implants because there was no showing that the defend-
ant had a substantial share of the breast implant market. 20 Fi-
nally, the court stated that breast implants, unlike DES, are not
inherently dangerous products.' 2 '
D. Acceptance of Market Share Liability in Products Outside
DES
Outside of DES, the only two products liability areas in which
the courts have relaxed the causation identification are in the
realm of vaccines and blood products. In Sheffield v. Eli Lilly &
Co.,' 22 a California appellate court rejected market share liability
where a plaintiff was injured by a defective antipolio vaccine. Sev-
eral years after Sheffield, however, a federal district court in Cali-
fornia allowed a market share action in Morris v. Parke, Davis &
Co..' 23 The plaintiff in Morris also alleged that a vaccine caused his
injuries and that he was unable to identify the precise manufac-
turer of the drug. 24 The Morris court found that the diphtheria-
pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccine differed enough from the polio
117. Id. at 92.
118. Id. at 94.
119. Id. at 92 (citing Ellis v. Int'l Playtex, 745 F.2d 292, 296-97 (4th Cir. 1984)).
120. Id. at 93.
121. Id. at 93-94.
122. 192 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Ct. App. 1983).
123. 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
124. Id. at 1334.
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vaccine in Sheffield to justify relaxing the standard of causation. 125
In Sheffield, the court dismissed a market share solution largely
because the polio vaccine was manufactured defectively by only
one company. In contrast, Morris held that all of the defendant's
DPT vaccines were defective and that the defendants were collec-
tively negligent in manufacturing, testing, storing, and marketing
the vaccine.
126
Despite the Morris court's decision to liberally apply the mar-
ket share theory of liability, the decision has not been extended
beyond California. In fact, in Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals,1 2' another decision addressing a market share claim for DPT
injuries, the Oregon court did not follow Morris.128 Instead, the
Senn court held that alternate liability represented a significant
change in traditional tort law causation and that it was the task of
the legislature to effect a change of this magnitude.1 29 Similarly, in
Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories,1'" the New Jersey court refused to
apply market share liability to a case involving injuries allegedly
caused by the DPT vaccine. The Shackil court held that imposing
"market share liability in this case would cut against the societal
goals of maintaining an adequate supply of life-saving vaccines and
of developing safer alternatives to current methods of
vaccinations." 31
The only other area that courts have adopted market share
liability outside the DES context is in cases involving hemophiliacs
allegedly infected with the HIV virus from the use of Factor
VIII.132 In Smith v. Cutter Biological Inc.,1 33 the Supreme Court of
Hawaii concluded that market share liablity was appropriate in a
case involving a hemophiliac allegedly infected with AIDS from a
blood product.134 As cases such as Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic
Corp. and Doe v. Cutter Biological Inc. illustrate, however, this is
not the trend in Factor VIII litigation. In fact, in a recent case
addressing this issue, the approach taken by the Smith court was
rejected. 3 5
Despite the Morris and Smith decisions, courts are still reluc-
125. Id. at 1340-43.
126. Id. at 1342.
127. 751 P.2d 215 (Or. 1988).
128. Id. at 219-23.
129. Id. at 223.
130. 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989).
131. Id. at 529.
132. Doe v. Cutter Biological Inc., 971 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1992).
133. 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991).
134. Id. at 728.
135. Doe v. Cutter Biological Inc., 852 F. Supp. 909, 914 (D. Idaho 1994).
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tant to apply market share liability to other torts with latent mani-
festation of injury. Further, Morris and Smith have neither re-
flected nor signaled a trend toward the use of market share
liability with respect to DPT and blood products in other
jurisdictions.
E. Summary
Few products liability decisions have been more controversial
than Sindell. In fact, no case has so clearly cast aside the causal
link between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's wrongful
conduct. Consequently, courts are sharply divided on whether to
adopt the market share theory in DES cases,1'6 and few courts
have extended it at all beyond the DES context. Theoretically,
however, market share liability may be applicable if three condi-
tions are satisfied by the plaintiff: (1) the plaintiff is unable to
identify the manufacturer of the product that caused the injury;
(2) the plaintiff has joined the manufacturers of a substantial share
of the injury-causing product; and (3) the defective product is ge-
neric, and thus each manufacturer's product shares the same de-
fective qualities.137 As these decisions reveal, few jurisdictions have
actually adopted market share liability. Those jurisdictions that
have adopted market share liability have done so almost exclu-
sively within the factual context of DES cases. In fact, it appears
that only one federal district court has adopted market share lia-
bility in the same form as California. 38 While market share liabil-
ity has been extended to non-DES cases involving vaccines and
blood products, these decisions have not been followed. Courts
simply refuse to adopt any theory of nonidentification liability,
reasoning that to do so would result in a distortion of traditional
concepts of liability. In sum, market share liability does not play a
significant role in traditional products liability actions.139
136. States accepting variations of market share liability for DES include Florida, New
York, Washington and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla.
1990); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689
P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984).
137. See generally Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Sindell v. Abbott
Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
138. MeElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265, 270-71 (D.S.D. 1983).
139. Examples of jurisdictions which have rejected market share liability include Illi-
nois, Iowa, and Missouri. See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990);




III. LEAD-BASED PAINT LITIGATION
A. The Scope of the Problem
Lead is a known toxicant that acts primarily to disrupt the
functioning of the central nervous system. 140 At high levels, how-
ever, virtually all parts of the body can be seriously injured by lead
exposure. 41 Lower levels of lead exposure are particularly danger-
ous for young children and can result in neurological damage with
long-lasting effects on intelligence, motor control, hearing, and
emotional development.1 42 Moreover, in 1985, the Environmental
Protection Agency classified lead as a probable human
carcinogen. 143
Additionally, lead is a poisonous element that may accumulate
in the body through exposure from air, food, soil, and dust. 14
Lead-based paint contaminates soil and dust and can be ingested
directly as paint chips. Although lead from gasoline combustion
and lead solder poses a significant health risk to human beings,
1 45
lead-based paint remains the most pervasive source of lead expo-
sure among children living in poorly maintained homes. 46 Chil-
dren are more susceptible to lead poisoning because they ingest
and absorb a greater amount of lead per unit body measure than
do adults. In households where lead paint is peeling off the
walls, and lead is found in the form of household dust and chips, a
child's normal hand-to-mouth behavior is sufficient to expose that
child to dangerously toxic levels of lead.1 48 Pica, a severe manifes-
tation of the childhood tendency to put things in one's mouth,
140. HUD PLAN, supra note 2, at 2-1. There is no known beneficial purpose for lead in
the human body. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2-2. Studies conducted on animals have linked lead with cancer and repro-
ductive abnormalities. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2-10.
146. Jane S. Lin-Fu, Lead Poisoning and Undue Lead Exposure in Children: History
and Current Status, in Low LEVEL LEAD ExPosuRE: THE CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 'OF CURRENT
RESEARCH 5, 11 (H.L. Needleman ed., 1980).
147. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-5; see also HUD PLAN,
supra note 2.
148. See Evan Charney, Lead Poisoning in Children: The Case Against Household
Lead Dust, in LEAD ABSORPTION IN CHILDREN: MANAGEMENT, CLINICAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ASPECTS 79 (J. Julian Chisohn, Jr. & David M. O'Hara eds., 1982); see also HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-44 (stating that dust and soil remain major




places many children in aggravated danger.149
Until 1940, lead was the prime additive in both interior and
exterior house paints. 150 Since lead is impervious to corrosion, it
was regarded as an ideal element for use in paint."' In 1955, some
manufacturers of interior paint voluntarily lowered the amount of
lead in their paints to as low as one percent. 15 2 Despite this initia-
tive on the part of paint manufacturers, their voluntary actions did
little to reduce the lead-based paint hazard. 5 3 A recent Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) survey revealed
that of the seventy-seven million privately owned homes built
before 1980, fifty-seven million contained some degree of lead
paint.1
5 4
Federal legislative response to the hazards of lead paint has
been inadequate. The Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act
of 1971 (LPPPA) authorized HUD to eliminate existing lead paint
in public and other federally assisted housing. 5 5 Because HUD's
jurisdiction is limited to federally constructed or funded hous-
ing, 15 HUD could not direct federal action at the private-housing
level aside from mandating the permissible amount of lead content
in paint sold in stores. Consequently, while the LPPPA addresses
the problem of future lead abatement in publicly owned housing, it
fails to provide for either the abatement of pre-existing lead paint
in the private sector or remedial, compensatory mechanisms for
victims of lead paint poisoning.1 Additionally, state lead paint
149. Pica has been described as a "perverted appetite for non-food items." Jane S. Lin-
Fu, The Evolution of Childhood Lead Poisoning as a Public Health Problem, in LEAD AB-
SORPTION IN CHILDREN: MANAGEMENT, CLINICAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS 3 (J. Julian
Chisoln, Jr. & David M. O'Hara eds., 1982).
150. See Michele Gilligan & Deborah A. Ford, Investor Response to Lead-Based Paint
Abatement Laws: Legal and Economic Considerations, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 243, 246
(1987). Lead paint manufactured before 1940 contained dry solids composed of as much as
40% lead. After 1940, however, lead was gradually replaced by alternative compounds such
as zinc. Id.
151. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 172
(2d ed. 1990).
152. Gilligan & Ford, supra note 150, at 246.
153. See id. The voluntary action of certain manufacturers to lower the amount of lead
contained int their paint products did little to abate the lead paint poisoning problem be-
cause not all companies lowered their standards. Id. at 246-47.
154. HUD PLAN, supra note 2, at xvii.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 4822 (1982).
156. See id. Although Congress ordered HUD to eliminate the dangers associated with
lead paint, of the 21 million homes which contain lead paint at hazardous levels, only 2.2
million fall within the jurisdiction of HUD. Edmund J. Ferdinand, III, Asbestos Revisited:
Lead-Based Toxic Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 5 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 581, 601 n.62 (1992).
157. See Diane Cabo Freiere, Private Causes of Action Against Manufacturers of
Lead-Based Paint: A Response to the Lead Paint Manufacturers' Attempt to Limit Their
746 [Vol. 43
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
prevention statutes are severely limited because they usually con-
tain limitations on fines for nonabatement which have the effect of
alleviating the landlord's incentive to abate the existing lead
hazard. 8
B. Lead-Based Paint Litigation
In the 1990s, civil lawsuits were filed, not against property
owners who use lead paint, but against the manufacturers of the
paint itself. 5 9 These suits, filed in Massachusetts and federal
courts, were the first attempt to hold the lead industry responsible
for the poisonings associated with their products. The defendants -
Glidden, Sherwin Williams, Eagle Picher, and other familiar brand
names - were charged with breach of warranty, defective product
design, and negligence.6 0 Regardless of the plaintiffs legal theory,
however, the identification requirement has proven to be a signifi-
cant obstacle.
C. The Identification Requirement
Plaintiffs targeting manufacturers of lead pigments are con-
fronted with the problem of the "unidentifiable defendant.' 6'
Under traditional tort principles, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the named de-
fendant caused the alleged harm.l6 2 This rule of tort law is known
Liability by Seeking Abrogation of Parental Immunity, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 381,
385-86 (1991).
158. See, e.g., Louisiana Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention and Control Act, LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.20-.29 (West 1977); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1370-76(a) (McKinney
1971 & Supp. 1995).
159. See Neal B. Glick, Lead Paint Liability Continues to Escalate, MAss. LAW.
WKLY., May 11, 1992, at 42.
160. These victims of lead poisoning have also brought actions against the Lead Indus-
tries Association (LIA). The LIA, which is a trade association for manufacturers and proces-
sors of lead products, is accused of concealing the poisonous qualities of lead paint from the
public. See Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Mass. 1992), aff'd, 3
F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993).
161. See Annotation, Product Liability: Necessity and Sufficiency of Identification of
Defendants as Manufacturers or Seller of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, 51
A.L.R.3D 1344, 1349 (1973) (discussing the requirement that an injured plaintiff in a prod-
ucts liability action must supply "proof that the defendant produced, manufactured, sold, or
was in some way responsible -for the product."); 63 AM. JuR. 2D Products Liability § 163
(1984) (discussing the requirement that it must actually be shown that the manufacturer-
defendant did in fact manufacture the product which caused injury).
162. KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 41, at 269-72 (discussing the burden of proof the




as the identification requirement.16
Plaintiffs in products liability lawsuits usually do not need to
litigate the issue of identification because they generally know the
identity of the manufacturer or seller of the product that caused
their injury.14 In lead-based paint cases, however, the plaintiffs
cannot definitively prove which manufacturer's product caused the
alleged harm to the lead poisoned victim because the injury-caus-
ing product usually consists of many layers of paint.6 5 These
plaintiffs are confronted with the problem of trying to identify a
particular manufacturer of lead-based pigment as the supplier of
the lead-based paint that caused their injuries."6" Since plaintiffs
cannot trace the paint on their walls to a particular defendant,
they are unable to satisfy the cause-in-fact requirement of their
case. In turn, courts are confronted with deciding whether to im-
pose liability on the manufacturers of lead paint for the damage
collectively, but anonymously, caused by their products.
In an attempt to overcome this causation problem, plaintiffs
have brought suit under a market share theory of liability.167
Under this judicially-created exception to the requirement of proof
of causation, defendants may be held liable even though the plain-
tiff cannot prove which defendant manufactured the injury-causing
product.16 8 Under this theory, every lead pigment manufacturer
would be liable for damages in proportion to its share of the lead
paint market.
D. Market Share Liability and Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams
Co.
The recent Santiago decision demonstrates the fundamental
difficulties encountered by plaintiffs who bring lawsuits against the
163. Id. § 103, at 712-15; see generally Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigan, Fail-
ure to Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a Legislative Solution, 73 CAL L. REV.
941, 974 (asserting that "[t]he case in which a person injured by a product can prove that
his or her injuries result from culpable conduct of the manufacturer but is unable to identify
the manufacturer is a peculiar problem requiring a unique legislative solution.").
164. 63 Ar. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 164 (1984).
165. See Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 547 (1st Cir. 1993).
166. Id.
167. See Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding
that the plaintiff failed to establish the liability of lead paint manufacturers based upon
their market share), aff'd, 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607
P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (imposing market share liability on DES
manufacturers).
168. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 104, at 714. Market share theory of liability
allows a plaintiff to bypass the traditional requirement of identifying the defendant that
caused the plaintiff's alleged injury. Id § 104, at 713-15.; see also supra pp. 6-13.
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lead industry under the market share theory of liability. In 1987,
Monica Santiago initiated an action against several manufacturers
of lead pigment contained in lead-based paint, charging them with
negligent product design, negligent failure to warn, breach of war-
ranty, and concert of action.169 Specifically, she alleged that "de-
fendants, by and through defendant Lead Industry Association
(LIA), 'mislead retailers, users, applicators, and parents of young
children . . . with respect to the unreasonable risks and hazards
posed to young children by the lead produced and marketed by
them and by the paint containing such lead.' ,,170
From the time of her birth in 1972, until 1978, Santiago and
her family resided in an apartment in Boston, Massachusetts. The
walls and woodwork of their apartment contained several layers of
paint that had been applied during various times beginning in
1917.171 Initially, Santiago displayed no symptoms of lead poison-
ing. At the age of four, however, her teachers noticed that she was
hyperactive, dreamy, and that she lacked perceptual and motor
skills. Specialists at Children's Hospital and the Dorchester
Mental Health Center diagnosed Santiago "as having severe and
permanent cognitive and developmental disabilities.' ' 7 2 In 1976,
Santiago was diagnosed with lead poisoning and as a result, had to
undergo chelation therapy in order to remove the lead from her
body.1
7 3
Since Santiago was unable to identify which manufacturer of
lead pigment was the source of lead-based paint used in her apart-
ment, her attorney sought to dispense with the identification re-
quirement and hold the defendants liable under a market share
theory of liability.I7 4 In support of a market share theory, Santi-
ago's counsel based her argument on the following evidence: (1)
expert testimony stating that lead paint "was at minimum a sub-
stantial contributing factor of her poisoning;" (2) all of the defend-
ants produced significant amounts of white lead between the years
169. 782 F. Supp. at 187. The defendants in this action are Sherwin-Williams Com-
pany, NL Industries, Inc., Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., Atlantic Richfield Corporation, and
SCM Corporation. Id. at 188. Additionally, the defendants are all members of the LIA. Id.
170. Id. at 188.
171. Id.
172. Renee Loth, When Will We Stop Poisoning Our Children?, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
21, 1988, at 35-36.
173. Id. Chelation treatment involves administering chelating agents by injection. Che-
lating agents work to remove lead atoms from the tissues of a child's body for excretion
through the kidney and liver. Chelation treatment allows high levels of lead in tissue to be
rapidly reduced to normal levels. See J. Julian Chisolm, Jr., Lead Poisoning, 224 ScI. AM.,
Feb. 1971, at 15, 22.
174. Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 188.
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1917 and 1970; (3) the defendants manufactured practically all of
the white lead produced for paint between the years 1917 and
1970; and (4) all the defendants were members of the LIA, which
"coordinat[ed] promotional campaigns to increase white lead con-
sumption in paint and ... work[ed] to neutralize the growing
public concern about lead paint poisoning.
175
1. The District Court Decision. The United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts rejected the market share
theory as a matter of Massachusetts law and granted summary
judgment to defendants on the plaintiff's market share claim.
170
Chief District Judge Joseph Tauro stated that "[s]ummary judg-
ment for defendant is appropriate where a plaintiff cannot show
'that there [i]s a greater likelihood or probability that the harm
complained of was due to causes for which the defendant was re-
sponsible than from any other cause.' "177 Consequently, in order
for the plaintiff to succeed on her claim, the district court required
her to produce evidence "from which the jury may conclude that is
more probable than not" that the defendants' product caused the
injury.17 8 Thus, the district court held that the plaintiff could not
maintain her products liability action against the manufacturers of
lead pigment on the market share theory. The district court articu-
lated two reasons in support of its decision: (1) evidence existed
that factors other than lead pigment in paint caused her injuries;170
and (2) evidence existed that the defendants did not actively par-
ticipate in the market for lead-based paint during the period of
time encompassed by the plaintiff's theory.1 80
175. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 548 (1st Cir. 1993).
176. Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 195.
177. Id. at 193 (quoting Lynch v. Merrell-National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1197 (1st Cir.
1987)).
178. Id. (quoting Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (D.S.C. 1981)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 194-95. Although plaintiff's counsel asserted that the defendants manufac-
tured practically all the white lead produced during the years the lead paint had been ap-
plied to the walls and woodwork of the plaintiff's home, the court found that several factors
made it impossible for the court to calculate the defendants' market share during the rele-
vant period. During the fifty-four year period that the plaintiff sought to hold the defend-
ants liable, the defendants offered evidence that showed that they moved in and out of the
market during that time. In fact, by 1954, three of the five defendants had stopped produc-
ing white lead pigments. Id. at 194. Additionally, one defendant "did not begin producing
white pigment until 1924, and it stopped in the late 1950's," and the "[d]efendant Sherwin-
Williams has shown, moreover, that by the mid-1930's its lead pigment was used primarily
for commercial and industrial applications." Id.
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2. The First Circuit Decision. Subsequently, Santiago
brought her case to the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.181 Santiago's principal argument on appeal was that
the district court had erroneously interpreted Payton v. Abbott
Laboratories."8 2 In Payton, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts is3 (SJC) addressed the question of whether DES manufac-
turers should be held liable under a market share theory of liabil-
ity.184 The Payton court rejected market share liability as
advanced by the plaintiffs in that class action. 85 The court rea-
soned that if it were to accept the plaintiffs' arguments, the tradi-
tional identification requirement would be severely undermined
because wrongdoers would no longer "be held liable only for the
harm they have caused, and. . . tortfeasors would [not] be sepa-
rated from innocent actors."'' 86
Santiago argued, however, that the Payton court sought only
to reject the particular form of market share liability advanced by
the DES plaintiffs,8 " and that the court did not intend to create a
complete bar to recovery based on the theory. In support of her
claim, Santiago based her argument on dicta in the Payton opin-
ion. 88 After rejecting the form of market share liability sought by
the plaintiffs, the Payton court stated:
That is not to say that on an adequate record this court would not recognize
some relaxation of the traditional identification requirement in appropriate
circumstances so as to allow recovery against a negligent defendant of that
portion of a plaintiff's damages which is represented by the defendant's
contribution ... to the market in the relevant period of time.189
The First Circuit, however, concluded that Santiago's reliance
on Payton was unwarranted. Instead the court, quoting Payton,
181. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993).
182. 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
183. The highest court in the state of Massachusetts is the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.
184. Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 188.
185. Id. at 171. Payton was a class action brought by daughters of women who ingested
DES while pregnant. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
certified the case to the SJC. Id. at 173.
186. Id. at 188.
187. In Payton, the SJC refused to permit recovery because the plaintiffs wanted mar-
ket share liability to be applied with two important variations: (1) the plaintiffs would be
allowed to proceed against and recover 100% of the damages from only six named DES
manufacturers when there was a larger number of potential tortfeasors that may have been
negligent toward the plaintiffs; and (2) that defendants would be prohibited from presenting
exculpatory proof. Id.
188. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 549 (1st Cir. 1993).
189. Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 190.
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stated that "[i]dentification of the party responsible for causing in-
jury to another is a longstanding prerequisite to. a successful negli-
gence action." 190 The First Circuit interpreted Payton narrowly as
a case which considered market share liability only in the context
of DES and rejected the theory as proffered by the plaintiffs. 191
Moreover, the First Circuit reasoned that even if it were to
accept the plaintiff's assertions that the SJC would relax the iden-
tification requirement in some situations, the SJC would not do so
in the instant case.192 Federal Circuit Judge Stahl held that the
"SJC['s] professed interest in both holding wrongdoers liable only
for the harm they have caused and in separating tortfeasors from
innocent actors" would prevent the plaintiff from proceeding on
her market share claim. 93 Hence, both the district court and the
First Circuit expressed concerns over the danger of holding
tortfeasors and innocent actors similarly liable.
In refusing to apply market share liability, the First Cirucit
found that the circumstances surrounding Santiago's case were
simply too far removed from those of the DES plaintiffs. First, the
court was not convinced that the plaintiff's injuries resulted solely
from lead poisoning. The court noted the absence of any direct evi-
dence that the plaintiff actually ingested the lead paint present in
her home. 94 The court also pointed to evidence that suggested
that in addition to lead paint, it was possible that the plaintiff was
exposed to other sources of lead. Because there was evidence that
the plaintiff's neighborhood was heavily contaminated with lead,
the court found it possible that the plaintiff could have been ex-
posed to lead from air, food, water, soil, and/or dust. 9 5 Accord-
ingly, the court found that there was insufficient evidence for a
reasonable fact finder to infer that lead paint was "a substantial
contributing factor" to the plaintiff's injuries.19 6
Finally, the First Circuit found that it was clear from the rec-
ord that the defendants' contributions to the lead paint market
fluctuated significantly during the fifty-three year period that the
layers of lead paint were applied to the walls of the plaintiff's
apartment.'97 Since it was impossible for the court to determine
the contribution each defendant made to the risk of harm, the
190. Santiago, 3 F.3d at 550 (quoting Payton v. Abbott Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188
(Mass. 1982)).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 551.
193. Id. at 550.
194. Id. at 547 n.3.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 550.
197. Id. at 551.
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court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a
finding that all or any of the defendants actively participated in
the lead pigment market during the relevant time period involved.
Additionally, the court noted that the dicta relied upon by the
plaintiff permitted recovery only on "that portion of a plaintiff's
damages which is represented by that defendant's contribution
.. . to the market in the relevant period of time."19 8 The First
Circuit concluded that "[g]iven these facts, it is difficult to discern
the basis upon which any market share determination would be
premised." 199
IV. LEAD-BASED PAINT LITIGATION AFTER Santiago
A. Judicial Limitation of Market Share Liability
The Santiago decision is a substantial addition to the line of
cases limiting market share liability to the DES context. Implicit
in all of these decisions is the notion that boundaries must be set
to limit liability for the consequences of one's actions. Strict adher-
ence to this notion by the courts, however, will unduly limit the
scope of market share liability to DES-related injuries.
Santiago and its predecessors further represent a decision by
the courts to affirmatively disallow recovery to plaintiffs who seek
redress for a vast array of latent injuries. In modern society, where
more consumers are confronted with an increasing risk of being in-
jured by products that not only cause latent injuries but are diffi-
cult or impossible to trace to a specific manufacturer, one cannot
help but question the prudence of limiting market share liability to
the DES context.
B. Rejection of Market Share Liability in Santiago2 00
In the wake of Santiago, it now appears that courts will con-
tinue to limit market share liability to DES claims. In Santiago,
the court articulated three reasons for refusing to extend that mar-
ket share liability to lead paint induced injuries: (1) the plaintiff
lacked a unique signature injury; (2) the evidence produced by the
defendants made it impossible for the court to determine the de-
fendant's market share; and (3) market share liability has never
been applied to defendants who were bulk suppliers of a harmful
198. Id. (quoting Payton v. Abbott Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171, 190 (Mass. 1982)).
199. Id.
200. For purposes of discussion, the district court's analysis of market share liability
will be employed. The district court provided a more thorough account of market share
liability than the circuit court.
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ingredient in an injury-causing product.
1. Absence of a Unique Signature Injury. First, the court re-
jected market share theory because the injuries resulting from the
ingestion of lead paint could have been caused by many factors
other than lead paint. In DES cases, the presence of a "signature"
injury guaranteed that the injury was caused by the defendant
manufacturers.201 In the absence of a signature injury, doubt ex-
isted as to whether Santiago's injury was actually attributable to
the lead paint in her apartment or simply to the background risk.
The Santiago court accepted the defendant's arguments that "he-
reditary, social and environmental factors, or lead in other prod-
ucts, could have caused, or at least contributed to, Santiago's inju-
ries. ' '2 0 In the absence of a signature injury, application of market
share liability to lead paint simply became too speculative.
2. The Market Share of the Defendants. In the DES con-
text, it was possible to limit the defendants to those manufacturers
who sold the drug during the year in which it was taken by preg-
nant women. In Santiago, however, not all the defendants pro-
duced the product during the entire fifty-three year period when
the paint was applied to the plaintiff's apartment. According to
Payton, in order to hold the defendants liable under market share
liability, each defendant must have "actively participated in the
DES market during all or a substantial part of the relevant period
of time in which the mothers of the plaintiffs ingested DES. ''203 In
contrast, the defendants in Santiago produced evidence that sev-
eral of the named defendants ceased producing white lead pig-
ments by 1954.204 Therefore, unlike in the DES context, there was
no equitable manner to define the market share of the defendants
in Santiago.
3. Defendants As Bulk Suppliers. Finally, the causal connec-
tion between the defendants' product and the plaintiff's injury in
Santiago is further attenuated because the plaintiff sought to hold
201. In the case of DES, since the plaintiffs suffered from adenocarcinoma, a rare form
of cancer that was directly caused by exposure to DES "there [was] no doubt that DES, and
not a background risk, caused plaintiff's injury." Nancy L. Firak, The Developing Policy
Characteristics of Cause-In-Fact: Alternative Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof
and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 TEri. L.Q. 311, 334 (1990).
202. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 192 (D. Mass. 1992), aff'd, 3
F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993).
203. Payton v. Abbott Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188 (Mass. 1982).
204. Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 193; see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
the defendants liable as bulk suppliers of lead pigment. 0 5 In the
DES context, however, during the twenty-four years that DES re-
mained on the market, approximately three hundred different
companies manufactured and distributed the drug according to its
generic formula, and many of these companies marketed DES ge-
nerically.206 Unlike DES defendants, lead pigment manufacturers
could not control all the risks their products posed to the public.
As the court noted, "the paint manufacturers, not [the] defend-
ants, were the ones that decided what amount of lead pigment to
use, and whether to use any lead pigment at all. ' 20 7 Therefore,
Chief Judge Tauro stated that "[n]o other court has applied mar-
ket share theory to a defendant that supplies an ingredient for a
product packaged and sold by other others" and "[t]he facts of
this case do not warrant a different result."208
C. Critique of Santiago
1. McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories. The Santiago deci-
sion is flawed because the court failed to consider the form of mar-
ket share approach that was adopted by the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts in McCormack v. Abbott
Laboratories. The Santiago court failed to recognize that the form
of market share liability adopted by the McCormack court is flexi-
ble enough to overcome the obstacles that precluded recovery in
Santiago. Instead, the First Circuit summarily addressed the im-
plications of McCormack in a footnote, stating:
[w]e are aware that the United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts, relying on the dicta in Payton, approved a market share theory
of recovery in a DES case. We note simply that the McCormack case was
never appealed and that we have not had, nor do we now have, occasion to
pass on the correctness of its holding."'
If the Santiago court had given more consideration to the McCor-
mack decision, it would have realized that market share liability is
indeed flexible enough to apply to the facts of Santiago's case.
In McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories,210 the district court
adopted the form of market share liability advance by the Martin
205. Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 194.
206. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333, 339 (IMI. App. Ct. 1988), rev'd, 560
N.E.2d 324 (IMI. 1990).
207. Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 195.
208. Id.
209. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 551 n.9 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted).
210. 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985).
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court. The court concluded that of the then existing variations of
market share liability, the framework established in Martin was
most consistent with the concerns that the SJC expressed in Pay-
ton.21 1 The McCormack court held that under Massachusetts law,
market share liability would be applied to the plaintiff's action
against drug manufacturers for injuries resulting from their
mother's ingestion of DES. 12 Under McCormack, a plaintiff may
avail herself of market share liability if she can prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that:
(a) that plaintiff's mother ingested DES during the pregnancy which re-
sulted in plaintiff's birth; (b) that DES caused plaintiff's subsequent inju-
ries; (c) that the defendant or defendants produced or marketed the type of
DES taken by plaintiff's mother; and (d) that the defendant or defendants
acted negligently in producing or marketing the DES.
2 13
Furthermore, the court noted that the plaintiff does not need
to allege or prove that a defendant produced or marketed the par-
ticular product that injured the plaintiff. Instead, the plaintiff only
needs to prove that "a defendant produced or marketed the type
of [product], as distinguished by color, shape, size or markings,"
used or consumed by the plaintiff.2 4 Most importantly, the court
provided that:
[i]ndividual defendants may exculpate themselves from liability by proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that they did not produce or market the
particular type of [product] . . . or that they did not market [the product]
in the relevant geographic market area; or that they did not distribute the
[product] during the time period.
15
Therefore, under McCormack, once the plaintiff satisfies her bur-
den of proof, defendants are given an opportunity to exculpate
themselves by proving that the product they produced or marketed
could not have been consumed or used by the plaintiff. Those de-
fendants that are unable to exculpate themselves are initially pre-
sumed to have equal market shares of the injury-causing product.
These defendants, however, are permitted to rebut this presump-
211. Id. at 1526; see supra pp. 18-19. In Payton, the SJC refused to adopt market share
liability in the DES context, but expressed its views on market share liability. The court
favored a system that would not hold defendants jointly and severally liable and stated that
all defendants should be given the opportunity to exculpate themselves to ensure that inno-
cent defendants are not liable. Payton v. Abbott Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171, 189-90 (D. Mass.
1990).
212. McCormack, 617 F. Supp. at 1526.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. (footnote omitted).
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tion "by establishing [through] a preponderance of the evidence
their individual market share of [the product] in the plaintiff's
particular geographic market during the time period in
question.
'216
The McCormack court rejected the defendants' argument that
market share liability would violate the "letter and spirit of the
Payton decision. '217 Instead, the McCormack court found that a
form of market share liability that permitted defendants to excul-
pate themselves, and to reduce their potential liability by present-
ing evidence that reveals their actual market, does not "create the
risk of holding the named defendants liable in negligence for more
harm than they caused. '218
2. McCormack Applied to Santiago. In Santiago, the defend-
ants produced evidence that made it possible to determine their
individual market shares with more precision. For instance, de-
fendant Glidden produced evidence that it did not begin producing
white lead pigment until 1924. Defendant Sherwin-Williams was
also successful in proving to the court that by the mid-1930s, the
lead pigment it produced was used primarily for commercial and
industrial applications. From this evidence, however, the Santiago
court summarily rejected recovery under the market share theory.
In light of McCormack, it is difficult to understand how such a
conclusion was reached.
Although the defendants in Santiago did not produce exculpa-
tory evidence, they did produce the type of evidence that had the
effect of rebutting the presumption that all the negligent defend-
ants brought before the court have equal market shares. Under
McCormack and Martin, each defendant brought before the court
is initially presumed to have equal shares of the market and are
liable only for the percentage of the plaintiff's judgment that rep-
resents their presumptive market share. Each defendant is entitled
to rebut this presumption with evidence that indicates that its ac-
tual share of the plaintiff's market is less than its presumptive
share. This is precisely what the defendants in Santiago did, and
yet the court found that this evidence made it impossible to deter-
mine the contribution of harm attributable to each defendant.
The court should have construed such evidence as narrowing
the defendant's potential liability, and not as precluding recovery
completely. For instance, in the case of defendant Glidden, it pro-
duced evidence which limited its potential liability to the years be-
216. Id. at 1527.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1525.
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tween 1924 and the late 1950s. The plaintiff in Santiago attempted
to hold the defendants liable for a market share that expands
about five decades. Therefore, in light of the evidence it intro-
duced, defendant Glidden's market share would be limited to ap-
proximately thirty-six years instead of fifty years. In the event that
all the defendants in Santiago presented evidence that had the ef-
fect of reducing its market share, the plaintiff would collect less
than 100% of the judgment.
Under the form of market share liability adopted in Massa-
chusetts and Washington, the possibility of not collecting 100% of
the judgment provides the plaintiff with an incentive to join as
many defendants as possible. By allowing the defendant to pro-
duce evidence regarding its actual market share, the defendant is
able to reduce its liability in proportion to the probability that the
defendant caused the plaintiff's injury.
3. Analysis of the Santiago Court's Other Arguments. The
next obstacle precluding recovery on the market share theory of
liability is the fact that the plaintiff's injuries were not attributable
solely to lead paint exposure. Although lead paint is only one of a
number of potential sources of lead in the environment that can
contribute to lead-poisoning among the nation's children, accord-
ing to the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR), "[i]n terms of both qualitative impact and persistence
of hazard, as well as dispersal of the source into the population,
leaded paint has been and remains the major source for childhood
exposure and intoxication."219
Furthermore, "childhood blood lead levels [are] associated
with race, family income, [and] residence inside or outside of a
metropolitan central city. '220 In fact, "[tlhe lowest incidence [of
childhood lead poisoning] was found among white children in the
highest income group living outside central cities in metropolitan
areas of less than [one] million." ' In terms of Santiago's race,
family income, and the size and type of the residential area, she
was a member of the group with one of the highest incidence of
internal lead exposure.222
The ATSDR report also indicates that the higher blood lead
219. HUD PLAN, supra note 2 (quoting the U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCE & DISEASE REGISTRY, THE NATURE
AND ExTENT OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS
(1988)).





levels of children "in central cities can probably be explained by
more automobile and industrial emissions per capita than in sub-
urbs, and also by a greater proportion of old houses with lead-
based paint, often at higher lead paint concentrations [than homes
located in the suburbs]. 223
Even though the Santiago court found that Santiago's injuries
were not unique to lead-based paint exposure, the court disre-
garded the fact that lead paint is documented to be the leading
source of lead-poisoning in children, and that children in her race,
family income, and residential area, had one of the highest inci-
dences of elevated blood lead levels.
Finally, the Santiago court found that the defendants should
not be held liable under a market share theory because as bulk
suppliers of lead pigment to paint manufacturers, they "could not
control all of the risks that their products may have presented to
the public. 2 24 The court reasoned that since these defendants
could not control the amount of lead to be added to a particular
brand of paint, they should not be held liable under the market
share theory of liability.
Under traditional products liability doctrine, actions against
bulk suppliers who sell their products to a manufacturer are typi-
cally governed by section 338 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts which provides that:
[o]ne who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another
to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use
the chattel . . . if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that the
chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied,
and ... (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
225
Furthermore, the comment to section 338 sets forth various factors
which a court should consider to determine what precautions the
manufacturer or supplier of a product must take to satisfy the re-
quirement of reasonable care.226 These factors include the form of
any warnings given, the magnitude of the risk involved, and the
purpose for which the product is used.227 This is known as the
learned intermediary defense.
223. Id. 2-7, 2-10.
224. Santiago v. Sherwin-Willams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 195 (D. Mass. 1992), af'd, 3
F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 388 (1965).




While the learned intermediary defense228 has been utilized in
toxic tort cases, it has not met with universal acceptance. In Oman
v. Johns-Manville Corp.,228 the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial
court's refusal to give a learned intermediary instruction that the
defendants' asbestos-containing products were very dangerous, and
that the burden of placing a warning on the package was not very
great.
230
In light of Oman, it is clear that in a products liability lawsuit,
a plaintiff cannot rely on the learned intermediary defense to im-
pose liability on a bulk supplier of a toxic substance.281 Courts
have not applied market share liability to the suppliers of toxic
substances who sold their products to another manufacturer, sim-
ply because courts have been reluctant to extend market share lia-
bility outside of the DES context. Given the appropriate circum-
stances, the court should rely on section 338 to decide if the
learned intermediary defense should be an effective defense. This
determination should be made independent of any market share
considerations.
Finally, the court should adapt market share liability to the
unique facts of Santiago, namely, to defendants that are bulk sup-
pliers of lead pigment. The decision in Shackil v. Lederle Labora-
tories2 32 demonstrates that courts have been willing to adopt the
market share approach to fit the unique circumstances of a partic-
ular case.88 In Shackil, the Superior Court of New Jersey encoun-
tered a problem with applying market share liability to the manu-
facturers of the DPT vaccine. In the case of DPT, differences in
the respective composition of the vaccines existed because some
DPT vaccines contained more toxins than other DPT vaccines.
2 4
As a result, the New Jersey court adopted "risk-modified market
share liability. ' 2 5 Under this approach, market share serves as an
initial basis for allocation of damages among defendants. A defend-
228. The learned intermediary defense has been most successfully utilized in pharma-
ceutical cases. In such cases, the manufacturer's duty to warn has been limited to an obliga-
tion to advise the prescribing physician of any potential dangers from the use of the drug.
See Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
Because the prescribing physician can consider both the propensities of the drug and the
susceptibilities of the individual patient, and weigh the benefits of medication against po-
tential dangers, he acts as a learned intermediary between the manufacturer and the con-
sumer and relieves the manufacturer of its duty to warn the physician's patient. Id.
229. 746 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 970 (1985).
230. Id. at 233.
231. Id.
232. 530 A.2d 1287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), reu'd, 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1293.
235. Id. at 1302.
[Vol. 43
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
ant, however, may present evidence that indicates a unit of its
product engendered lower risk than a unit of another defendant's
product.23 6 Therefore, if a defendant can present evidence that
quantifies the extent to which its vaccine engendered a lower risk
of harm than the vaccines of other manufacturers, its percentage of
the damages is reduced accordingly.
23 7
Although this appellate court ruling was overturned by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, and was limited to vaccine cases,
Shackil indicates that courts can modify market share liability to
the facts of a particular case. The courts can devise a system for
allocating damages such that the manufacturer's liability approxi-
mates the damages that it caused without being confined to the
rigid set of facts that gave rise to the theory of market share
liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts generally refuse to apply market share liability to any
product outside of DES even though several versions of the theory
have been developed to address the shortcomings of the Sindell
approach. Simply put, courts have consistently regarded market
share liability as an inflexible, limited doctrine that only applies to
a narrow class of plaintiffs and defendants. Nothwithstanding judi-
cial resistance, however, market share liability is an innovative and
equitable doctrine with enormous potential. In fact, if courts were
to recognize the doctrine's flexiblity and great potential, commen-
tators have suggested that the theory can even be applied to com-
plex problems such as acid rain.2 8
Despite the judicial limitation of the doctrine, the underlying
premise for adopting a market share theory and applying it beyond
DES remains the same: it is an attempt to seek justice for the in-
nocent plaintiff who was injured by a product manufactured by an
industry of tortious defendants. Fairness dictates that society not
permit the injured plaintiff to go uncompensated while wrongdoers
profit from tortious conduct. The use of a market share theory pro-
vides a remedy for this inequitable situation.
In the case of lead paint, the futures of millions of children are
being jeopardized by the grave consequences of childhood lead
poisoning.23 9 The problem has been commonly characterized as a
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1293-94.
238. See Patricia J. Scully, Comment, Proof of Causation in a Private Action for Acid
Rain Damage, 36 ME. L. REv. 117, 141-50 (1984).
239. Martha R. Mahoney, Four Million Children at Risk: Lead Paint Poisoning Vic-
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"preventable 'silent epidemic' that is sweeping across the nation,
carrying with it major medical, social, and economic implica-
tions.240 The problem of childhood lead poisoning also becomes
more complex once the poverty of its victims is taken into consid-
eration. For instance, attorneys may be deterred from representing
lead poisoned victims because the projected lifetime earnings of
the impoverished victims are low. 241 Hence, compensation for chil-
dren injured by lead paint should be borne by those who are in a
superior position to bear the loss. It is clear that the lead paint
industry can bear the loss much better than the victims of lead-
based paint poisoning. According to William Prosser:
The defendants in tort cases are to a large extent public utilities, industrial
corporations, commercial enterprises, automobile owners, and others who by
means of rates, prices, taxes or insurance are best able to distribute to the
public at large the risks and losses which are inevitable in a complex civili-
zation. Rather than leave the loss on the shoulders of the individual plain-
tiff, who may be ruined by it, the courts have tended to find reasons to shift
it to the defendants.
24 2
Prosser's rationale, which forms one of the fundamental principles
of tort law, should not be ignored. In the case of lead poisoning,
the bottom line is that the costs paid by the victims, and the costs
paid by society as a whole, are simply too high to continue.
The concept of deterrence also demands that the market share
theory of liability be applied to hold defendant industries liable.243
The deterrence argument was best articulated by the Sindell court
when it stated: "The manufacturer is in the best position to dis-
cover and guard against defects in its products and warn of harm-
ful effects; thus holding it liable for defects and failure to warn of
tims and the Law, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 46, 46 (1990).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 47.
242. KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 4, at 24-25.
243. But see Roger S. Fine, A Personal Perspective From the "Manufacturer," 55
BROoK. L. REV. 899 (1989). In response to the Hymowitz decision in New York State, Fine,
an Associate General Counsel at Johnson & Johnson, Inc., argued that market share liability
does not operate to deter the conduct of DES defendants. Fine argued that business deci-
sions are generally based upon medical and scientific data, and FDA regulations, and not
legal doctrines such as market share liability or the threat of punitive damages. Id. at 901-
02. Fine also stated that the theory fails to punish or deter tortious conduct because those
individuals who were responsible for the wrongdoing are usually no longer in business. In
fact, Fine noted that the only real impact experienced by industries is an "administrative
one." Id. at 902. That is, in terms of manufacturers, Fine stated that "[w]e now have to
defend ourselves in a thousand lawsuits, even though it is highly unlikely that more than a




harmful effects will provide an incentive to product safety. '244 A
tortious defendant should not be shielded from liability when the
product it manufactures injures a vast number of consumers, sim-
ply because the product is non-traceable. The idea of a manufac-
turer being fully aware of the potential injuries that its product
may cause, but deciding not to warn of its dangers 'simply because
of the product's fungibility, is shocking and morally reprehensible.
Market share liability creates industry incentives to ensure prod-
uct safety.
Clearly, however, the rejection of market share liability in
Santiago and the cases preceding it represents an unwillingness by
courts to permit the doctrine to be used as a judicial remedy for
cases involving defective products that cause latent diseases. At
the same time, courts have neither adopted a single legal theory
nor a consistent set of standards to apply in latent, mass-injury
cases. Thus, it is probably safe to conclude that courts will con-
tinue to limit the application of market share liability to the DES
context.
In modern society, however, the inability or unwillingness of
courts to formulate a consistent standard will prove increasingly
untenable in light of the technological advances made each day. As
products become more complex, it will become more difficult to
predict the long-term effects of exposure to substances with the
potential to cause latent injury. Although courts are refusing to
provide a consistent set of rules to apply to latent injury cases, the
fact remains that latent diseases are occurring with greater num-
bers and will continue to grow in the future. Nearly fifteen years
after Sindell, the words of Justice Mosk most accurately describe
the dilemma at hand:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and
technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which
cannot be traced to any specific producer. The response of the courts can be
either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured
by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs.
Just as Justice Traynor in his landmark concurring opinion in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Company. . . recognized that in a era of mass produc-
tion and complex marketing methods that the traditional standard of negli-
gence was insufficient to govern the obligations of manufacturer to con-
sumer, so should we acknowledge that some adaption of the rules of
causation liability may be appropriate in these recurring circumstances.
2"5
Accordingly, fairness and justice demand that a doctrine based on
244. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
245. Id. at 935 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the market share of culpable industries be applied to provide a
remedy for the injured consumer who suffers from an injury that
does not manifest itself until decades after exposure. The time has
come to recognize the enormous potential of market share liability.
